Senate Confirmation of Cabinet Appointments: Congress-Centered, Presidency-Centered, and Nominee-Centered Explanations

31 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2011 Last revised: 6 Mar 2011

See all articles by James D. King

James D. King

University of Wyoming

James W. Riddlesperger

Texas Christian University

Abstract

Recent presidents have found greater proportions of their executive nominations encountering substantial opposition in the Senate. What accounts for failed nominations to senior-level executive positions? We address this question by examining 291 cabinet and other senior-level nominations between 1969 and 2009, testing multivariate models of the effects of the partisan and ideological composition of the Senate, the president’s public approval and electoral mandate, and characteristics of the nominee. The analysis demonstrates that allegations of illegal or unethical behavior by the nominee and concerns over policy preferences best explain the Senate’s response to executive nominations. It is clear that, unlike legislative outcomes, confirmation outcomes are the products of nominee-centered factors with presidency-centered factors and Congress-centered factors having little impact.

Keywords: president, senate, appointments

Suggested Citation

King, James D. and Riddlesperger, James W., Senate Confirmation of Cabinet Appointments: Congress-Centered, Presidency-Centered, and Nominee-Centered Explanations. Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1766729

James D. King (Contact Author)

University of Wyoming ( email )

Box 3434 University Station
Laramie, WY 82070
United States

James W. Riddlesperger

Texas Christian University ( email )

Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States

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