Electoral Competition and Political Corruption

Posted: 22 Feb 2011 Last revised: 24 Aug 2012

See all articles by Todd Donovan

Todd Donovan

Western Washington University

Regina Branton

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 23, 2012

Abstract

In this project, we examine the effects of electoral competition on political corruption. Specifically, we propose that electoral competition may facilitate some types of corruption, while mitigating others. We argue pressures of competitive elections may increase incentives for candidates and their supporters to violate laws that regulate the conduct of elections. We will examine if “election crimes� (defined by the DOJ as voter fraud and campaign finance violations) are more likely in competitive electoral settings. To examine this relationship we rely on data culled from the Department of Justice, Federal Elections Commission, and the Census Bureau. Specifically, we use information compiled by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Public Integrity Section regarding federal prosecutions of elected officials, Federal Elections Commission data on electoral competition in the setting where the official broke the law, and census data regarding demographics of the setting. The project will advance extant scholarship by linking data on several years of federal prosecutions to the electoral context of the violation.

Suggested Citation

Donovan, Todd and Branton, Regina, Electoral Competition and Political Corruption (August 23, 2012). Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1767271

Todd Donovan (Contact Author)

Western Washington University ( email )

516 High Street
Bellingham, WA 98225
United States

Regina Branton

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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