Administered Protection in the GATT/WTO System
27 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2011
Date Written: October 4, 2010
Abstract
All dogs have fleas, therefore all dogs have legs with which to scratch. Similarly, any government committed to a generally open trade policy will be pestered for ‘import relief’ by one industry or another – usually on grounds that its situation is ‘exceptional.’ It follows that governments will have procedures for fielding and managing such pressures. This paper examines how WTO member governments have used safeguards, antidumping, and other instruments of “administered” or “contingent” protection in the management of domestic pressures for protection. Three conclusions emerge:
1. These provisions have been extensively used but at the same time have remained under discipline. Application of the restrictions they allow has been minimal relative to the liberalization the GATT/WTO system has supported.
2. Reform-minded developing country governments have employed these rules skillfully to support their own liberalization programs.
3. Antidumping is perhaps the classic example of a pragmatically successful flexibility instrument with pretensions – but no more than pretensions – to a real economic rational.
Keywords: Safeguards, Antidumping, GATT, WTO, Trade Remedies, Trade Defense
JEL Classification: F13, F54, F55, F59
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization
-
Contingent Protection as Better Insurance
By Thomas Prusa and Ronald D. Fischer
-
Antidumping and Safeguard Mechanisms: The Brazilian Experience, 1988-2003
By Honorio Kume and Guida Piani
-
Political-Economy of Safeguards and Antidumping in Argentina
By Julio J. Nogues and Elias Baracat
-
Political Economy of Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina
By Julio J. Nogues and Elias Baracat
-
The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute
By Alan Sykes
-
Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization: The Mexican Case
-
By Elias Baracat and Julio J. Nogues