The Diversity of Concentrated Prescribing Behavior: an Application to Antipsychotics

46 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2011 Last revised: 21 Jun 2023

See all articles by Anna Levine Taub

Anna Levine Taub

Northeastern University

Anton Kolotilin

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Robert S. Gibbons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ernst R. Berndt

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: February 2011

Abstract

Physicians prescribing drugs for patients with schizophrenia and related conditions are remarkably concentrated in their choice among antipsychotic drugs. In 2007 the single antipsychotic drug prescribed by a physician accounted for 66% of all antipsychotic prescriptions written by that physician. Which particular branded antipsychotic was the prescriber's "favorite" varied widely across physicians, i.e. physician prescribing concentration patterns are diverse. Building on Frank and Zeckhauser's [2007] characterization of physician treatments varying from "custom made" to "ready-to-wear", we construct a model of physician learning that generates a number of hypotheses. Using 2007 annual antipsychotic prescribing behavior on 17,652 physicians from IMS Health, we evaluate these predictions empirically. While physician prescribing behavior is generally quite concentrated, prescribers having greater volumes, those with training in psychiatry, male prescribers, and those not approaching retirement age tend to have less concentrated prescribing patterns.

Suggested Citation

Levine Taub, Anna and Kolotilin, Anton and Gibbons, Robert S. and Berndt, Ernst R., The Diversity of Concentrated Prescribing Behavior: an Application to Antipsychotics (February 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w16823, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1770377

Anna Levine Taub (Contact Author)

Northeastern University ( email )

321 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
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Anton Kolotilin

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
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Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Robert S. Gibbons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics ( email )

E52-432
MIT
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Ernst R. Berndt

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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United States
617-253-2665 (Phone)
617-258-6055 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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