State Cooperation & the International Criminal Court: A Role for the United States?

12 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2011

Date Written: March 1, 2011

Abstract

This article appeared in a white paper from the American Society of International Law on the relationship between the United States and the International Criminal Court in the post-Kampala Review Conference period. This article is premised on the recognition that (1) the International Criminal Court is almost entirely dependent on State cooperation to effectuate its mandate to bring to justice individuals responsible for committing "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" and (2) cooperation is central to the evolving relationship between the ICC and the United States.

Notwithstanding the rapprochement between the ICC and the U.S. under the Obama administration, domestic legislation dating from the Bush Administration prohibits most forms of cooperation with the Court absent specific waivers or other contingencies. If the United States is to best position itself to use all international tools available to it to advance United States interests in responding effectively to the commission of international crimes, this legislation should be repealed or significantly scaled back. Short of ratifying the ICC Statute, this article discusses a number of ways that the United States can work with the Court to both promote the United States' foreign policy agenda and support the mission of the Court. It argues that re-engaging with the Court through appropriate cooperative efforts will go far toward restoring the United States to its prior leadership position in the arena of international justice.

Suggested Citation

Van Schaack, Beth, State Cooperation & the International Criminal Court: A Role for the United States? (March 1, 2011). Santa Clara University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 5-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1773681

Beth Van Schaack (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650 303 6832 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.stanford.edu/directory/beth-van-schaack/

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