'Leave Now': A Proposal to Reconcile Justice and Pragmatism in Democratically Transitioning Countries

Abstract

This paper proposes a mechanism to protect incipient democracies through the creation of an international pension system that would pay retiring leaders from those young democracies substantial sums upon stepping down democratically and constitutionally. It also considers under what circumstances the system may be extended to leaders who did not come to power democratically or who might have at least some antidemocratic history. These payments are designed to provide an incentive for peaceful transitions of power and improve the chances that democracy with regular transitions of power will consolidate. The Ibrahim Prize, an existing prize which provides retiring sub-Saharan African leaders who have met a high standard of governance with a substantial lifetime pension, is contrasted with the rule-based character of this award. The financial cost of endowing the award is analyzed. Various design decisions and potential problems are also extensively considered. Among those problems are the possibility that power is more important than money for some leaders, that the decision of a national leader to retire might not lead to a democratic transition, the existence of prior bad acts by potential recipients, the risk that the award might cheapen national leadership, and finally that there may be spoiler problems at both the international and domestic level.

Keywords: Ibrahim Prize, Pension, Democratic Transition, Democratization