Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
177 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Date Written: February 24, 2011
Abstract
We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player’s signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary.
Keywords: repeated game, folk theorem, private monitoring
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sugaya, Takuo, Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (February 24, 2011). Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 011-2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1789775 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789775
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