Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

177 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2011

See all articles by Takuo Sugaya

Takuo Sugaya

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: February 24, 2011

Abstract

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player’s signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary.

Keywords: repeated game, folk theorem, private monitoring

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D82

Suggested Citation

Sugaya, Takuo, Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (February 24, 2011). Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 011-2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1789775 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789775

Takuo Sugaya (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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