Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
51 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2011
Date Written: March 31, 2011
Abstract
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.
Keywords: term limits, electoral incentives, distributive politics, the Law of 1/N, US state legislatures
JEL Classification: D720
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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