Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures

51 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2011

See all articles by Toke Skovsgaard Aidt

Toke Skovsgaard Aidt

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics

Julia Shvets

University of Cambridge, Corpus Christi College

Date Written: March 31, 2011

Abstract

We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.

Keywords: term limits, electoral incentives, distributive politics, the Law of 1/N, US state legislatures

JEL Classification: D720

Suggested Citation

Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard and Shvets, Julia, Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures (March 31, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3405, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1803118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803118

Toke Skovsgaard Aidt (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
+44 1223 33 5231 (Phone)
+44 1223 33 5475 (Fax)

Julia Shvets

University of Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/shvets/

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