The Political and Legal Causes of Regulatory Delay in the United States: Four Case Studies of Air Pollution Permitting in the U.S. And Germany

UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 99-2

77 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 1999

See all articles by John P. Dwyer

John P. Dwyer

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; Law Offices of John P. Dwyer

Richard R. W. Brooks

New York University School of Law; Yale University - Law School

Alan C. Marco

Georgia Institute of Technology - School of Public Policy

Date Written: September 1999

Abstract

We compare the process to obtain air pollution emission permits for automobile assembly plants in the U.S. and Germany. The project consists of four case studies in which comparisons are made with respect to the costs of obtaining air pollution permits for assembly plant "paint shops"--the part of the factory where new cars and trucks are painted. The plants are owned by the same company, use nearly identical paint application technologies and paints, and use virtually the same air pollution control technologies. Moreover, both countries are federalist in structure, with the national government setting general standards, and the states issuing and enforcing individual permits. These similarities allow us to compare the permitting processes in U.S. and Germany, and to isolate the salient political and legal differences and economic consequences.

In both the United States and Germany, state air pollution agencies implement federal standards that effectively require the assembly plants to install similar pollution abatement technologies to control emissions resulting from increases in production or changes in paint composition. Nevertheless, the two countries' regulatory processes are rather different. Air pollution control laws, regulations, and plant-level permits in the U.S. are somewhat more stringent, detailed, and prescriptive than in Germany. Moreover, U.S. law provides substantially greater opportunity for public participation in agency permitting decisions, and at one U.S. plant, public participation significantly affected the regulatory outcome. For these and other reasons, the permitting processes at the U.S. plants were much slower and more conflictual than at the German plants, resulting in much longer delays in making production changes and installing new pollution controls.

Suggested Citation

Dwyer, John Patrick and Brooks, Richard R. W. and Marco, Alan C., The Political and Legal Causes of Regulatory Delay in the United States: Four Case Studies of Air Pollution Permitting in the U.S. And Germany (September 1999). UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 99-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=184051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.184051

John Patrick Dwyer (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Law Building
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-2667 (Phone)
510-643-2673 (Fax)

Law Offices of John P. Dwyer ( email )

1550 California St., Suite 6-201
San Francisco, CA 94109
United States

Richard R. W. Brooks

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212.998.6619 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=43731

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

Alan C. Marco

Georgia Institute of Technology - School of Public Policy ( email )

685 Cherry St.
Atlanta, GA 30332-0345
United States

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