The Optimal Regulation of Product Quality Under Monopoly

Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 13, pp. 1-4, 2006

5 Pages Posted: 18 May 2011

See all articles by Hans Zenger

Hans Zenger

European Union - Directorate General for Competition

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

This paper characterizes the optimal quality regulation of a monopolist when quality is observable. In contrast to Sheshinski (1976) it is shown that a minimum quality standard may be desirable even if it induces the firm to reduce output.

Suggested Citation

Zenger, Hans, The Optimal Regulation of Product Quality Under Monopoly (2006). Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 13, pp. 1-4, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1844750

Hans Zenger (Contact Author)

European Union - Directorate General for Competition ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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