Racial Differences in Inequality Aversion: Evidence from Real World Respondents in the Ultimatum Game

62 Pages Posted: 31 May 2011 Last revised: 20 Mar 2023

See all articles by John D. Griffin

John D. Griffin

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science

David Nickerson

University of Notre Dame

Abigail Wozniak

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Date Written: May 2011

Abstract

The distinct historical and cultural experiences of American blacks and whites may influence whether members of those groups perceive a particular exchange as fair. We investigate racial differences in fairness standards using preferences for equal treatment in the ultimatum game, where responders choose to allow a proposed division of a monetary amount or to block it. Although previous research has studied group differences in the ultimatum game, no study has been able to examine these across races in America. We use a sample of over 1600 blacks and whites drawn from the universe of registered voters in three states and merged with information on neighborhood income and racial composition. We experimentally vary proposed divisions as well as the implied race of the ultimatum game proposer. We find no overall racial differences in acceptance rates or aversion to unequal divisions. However, we uncover racial differences in the response to pecuniary returns conditional on inequality of the division. This is driven by the lowest income group in our sample, which represents the 10th percentile of the black income distribution. The racial differences are robust across gender and age groups. We also find that blacks are more sensitive to unfair proposals from other blacks.

Suggested Citation

Griffin, John D. and Nickerson, David and Wozniak, Abigail, Racial Differences in Inequality Aversion: Evidence from Real World Respondents in the Ultimatum Game (May 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17097, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1854199

John D. Griffin

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science ( email )

217 O'Shaughnessy Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

David Nickerson (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

361 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Abigail Wozniak

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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