The Strategic Implications of Firm-Specific Incentives - Dissertation Executive Summary

Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper

13 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2011

See all articles by David Kryscynski

David Kryscynski

Emory University - Department of Organization & Management

Date Written: April 1, 2011

Abstract

This three paper dissertation explores the strategic implications of firm-specific incentives . i.e. incentives that are more valuable to workers in their focal firms than similar incentives elsewhere. The first paper develops the theory of firm-specific incentives. The second paper uses data from 7770 software developers in 94 companies to show that firms with more firm-specific incentives have lower voluntary turnover rates and offer lower wage increases to workers over time – i.e. they exhibit lower wage-tenure slopes. The third paper uses data from 271 software firms to show that small firms have advantages offering incentives that are inherently firm-specific.

Keywords: strategy, incentives, human capital, competitive advantage, firms, software, wage, specific

Suggested Citation

Kryscynski, David, The Strategic Implications of Firm-Specific Incentives - Dissertation Executive Summary (April 1, 2011). Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1858919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1858919

David Kryscynski (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Organization & Management ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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