On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

34 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2011

See all articles by Andreas Nicklisch

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Irenaeus Wolff

University of Konstanz - TWI; CEREB

Date Written: June 3, 2011

Abstract

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these subjects strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment lead to harsher responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. The treatment effect is unaccounted for. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.

Keywords: distributional fairness, experiments, intention-based fairness, reciprocity, ultimatum bargaining

JEL Classification: C91, D03, D63

Suggested Citation

Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus, On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure (June 3, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1865132 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1865132

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

Irenaeus Wolff (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - TWI ( email )

Fach D-144
Universitätsstraße 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

CEREB ( email )

Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany

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