Whether to Hire Local Contract Teachers? Trade-Off between Skills and Preferences in India

48 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2011

See all articles by Sonja Fagernäs

Sonja Fagernäs

University of Sussex - Department of Economics

Panu Pelkonen

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); University of Sussex - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 21, 2011

Abstract

Whether to hire teachers locally on a contract basis, or via competitive examinations as government officials, is a major policy question in developing countries. We use a Discrete Choice Experiment to assess the job preferences of 700 future elementary school teachers in the state of Uttarakhand in India. The students have been selected using either competitive examination or from a pool of locally hired contract teachers. Skills in English, Arithmetic and Vocabulary are also tested. We find a trade-off between skills and preferences, as students hired using competitive examination have higher skills, but prefer posts in less remote regions.

Keywords: Discrete Choice Experiment, Education, Para-Teachers, Preferences, Skills

JEL Classification: H75, J24, J41, J45

Suggested Citation

Fagernäs, Sonja and Pelkonen, Panu and Pelkonen, Panu, Whether to Hire Local Contract Teachers? Trade-Off between Skills and Preferences in India (June 21, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1869223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1869223

Sonja Fagernäs

University of Sussex - Department of Economics ( email )

Mantell Building
Falmer
Brighton, Sussex BNI 9RF
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/128581

Panu Pelkonen (Contact Author)

University of Sussex - Department of Economics

Mantell Building
Falmer
Brighton, Sussex BNI 9RF
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/economics/people/peoplelists/person/258681

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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