Technology Competition and International Cooperation: Friends or Foes?

50 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2011

Date Written: July 2, 2011

Abstract

A large amount of literature in international and comparative political economy emphasizes the importance of competitive rivalry as a concern in technology policy. How does such competition influence international cooperation to control negative externalities, such as pollution? Is technology competition between rivals an impediment to international cooperation, or could it even help states achieve cooperation? We develop a game-theoretic model of the relationship between competition for technology markets and international cooperation. The model suggests that technology competition impedes international cooperation whenever states hold "techno-nationalist"' preferences but their ability to capture new markets is starkly asymmetric. States expecting to lose refuse to cooperate, so treaty formation fails. Under symmetric abilities, however, technology competition may even facilitate cooperation. States invest in new technologies for reasons of self-interest but accidentally reduce consumer prices for others. Comparative case studies in environmental cooperation provide empirical support for the model, and show how it can contribute to the empirical study of international cooperation.

Suggested Citation

Kim, Sung Eun and Urpelainen, Johannes, Technology Competition and International Cooperation: Friends or Foes? (July 2, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1877211 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1877211

Sung Eun Kim

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Johannes Urpelainen (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins SAIS ( email )

1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
United States

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