International Institutional Environment and Civil War Prevention

1 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 26 Aug 2011

See all articles by Johannes Karreth

Johannes Karreth

University at Albany, SUNY

Jaroslav Tir

University of Georgia - Department of International Affairs

Date Written: August 21, 2011

Abstract

We examine the potential of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (HSIGOs) to prevent the escalation of low-level domestic armed conflicts in member states to civil wars. A state’s HSIGO memberships alters the bargaining game between the government and rebels by increasing the costs of escalation (e.g., via sanctions) and decreasing the amount of benefits the state hoped to receive from future international cooperation. The anticipation of such consequences provides the government with an increased interest in settling the conflict before it escalates. This in turn also mitigates an important aspect of uncertainty associated with bargaining failure, including enhancing the credibility of commitments. Empirical analyses of all domestic armed conflicts from 1945-2000 provide robust support for the hypothesized conflict management function of HSIGO memberships. Consistent with our theorizing, follow-up tests and illustrative evidence from Indonesia and Ivory Coast show that the findings are driven by those HSIGOs that have the most ability to punish and/or reward member states and that HSIGO memberships help prevent low-level conflict escalation by increasing the likelihood of settlements.

Suggested Citation

Karreth, Johannes and Tir, Jaroslav, International Institutional Environment and Civil War Prevention (August 21, 2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900666

Johannes Karreth (Contact Author)

University at Albany, SUNY ( email )

1400 Washington Avenue
Albany, NY 12222
United States

Jaroslav Tir

University of Georgia - Department of International Affairs ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

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