Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Economic Ties and Locations of UN-Led Deployments

Abstract

Abstract: Recent scholarship and practitioners’ assessments identified peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as the most effective and efficient solution to the highly intractable problem of civil war recurrence. Yet, fewer than 40% of civil wars receive peacekeeping assistance at the conclusion of the conflict. In order to explain what determines whether an intrastate conflict receives a deployment of peacekeepers, we note that PKOs are costly endeavors requiring significant material investments. Focusing on the UN and its PKOs, we note that a relatively small group of states decides about (and funds) possible deployments. We therefore argue that the supply of costly UNPKOs is likely to, at least partially, reflect preferences and interests of these states. We argue that the economic ties between the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) and civil war state significantly influence the decision to authorize UNPKOs. We test this argument by utilizing measures of trade between P5 countries with civil war states, with the universe of cases being all post-World War II and post-Cold War civil war ceasefires. Findings show that economic interests of major powers play a key role in explaining which conflicts receive UN peacekeeping contingents.