The Evolution of Parliamentary Minority Rights in Western Europe

29 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 7 Aug 2011

See all articles by Michael Koß

Michael Koß

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper addresses the comparative politics of parliamentary minority rights, paying special attention to temporal, organizational, and contextual aspects. The major explanatory variables are the basic conflicts about parliamentary rules and resources underlying decisions on parliamentary minority rights. The more parliamentary actors aim to increase parliamentary legitimacy (as op-posed to parliamentary efficiency and/or effectiveness), the higher the level of protection for parliamentary minorities is expected to be. In this case, actors are assumed to follow a logic of appropriateness leading to the granting of more rights and resources to minorities and a looser coupling of decisions on minority rights and their institutional context. In the latter case, parlia-mentary minority rights are more likely to be regarded as a hindrance to legislative efficiency, giving rise to an interest-based logic of consequentialism. This is expected to result in lower levels of protection and resources for parliamentary minorities and a closer coupling of decisions on minority rights and their institutional context. The argument is illustrated empirically with refer-ence to two cases, Britain and Germany, which are examined during the initial intensification of political competition in the 1870–1918 period.

Keywords: Parliaments, Minority Rights, Institutionalism, Britain, Germany

Suggested Citation

Koß, Michael, The Evolution of Parliamentary Minority Rights in Western Europe (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900860

Michael Koß (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Social Sciences ( email )

Germany

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