Hayek, Gödel, and the Case for Methodological Dualism

Abstract

On a few occasions F.A. Hayek made reference to the famous Gödel theorems in mathematical logic in the context of expounding his cognitive and social theory. The exact meaning of the supposed relationship between Gödel´s theorems, on the one hand, and the essential proposition of Hayek´s theory of mind, on the other, remains subject to interpretation, however. The author of this paper argues that the relationship between Hayek´s thesis that the human brain can never fully explain itself on the one hand and the essential insight provided by Gödel´s theorems in mathematical logic, on the other, has the character of an analogy, or a metaphor. Furthermore the anti-mechanistic interpretation of Hayek´s theory of mind is revealed as highly questionable. Implications for the Socialist Calculation Debate are highlighted. It is in particular concluded that Hayek´s arguments for methodological dualism, when compared with those of Ludwig von Mises, actually amount to a strengthening of the case for methodological dualism.

Keywords: Hayek, theory of mind, Austrian methodology, Gödel, incompleteness theorems, methodological dualism, Socialist Calculation Debate

JEL Classification: B0, B4, B53