Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

23 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 1999

See all articles by Ugo Panizza

Ugo Panizza

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics; CEPR

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1999

Abstract

This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality

JEL Classification: K1, O1

Suggested Citation

Panizza, Ugo, Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality (September 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=192113 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.192113

Ugo Panizza (Contact Author)

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics ( email )

Geneva Avenue de la Paix 11A
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
190
Abstract Views
1,342
Rank
287,983
PlumX Metrics