The Past, Present and Future of Fixed Election Dates in Canada

Abstract

Fixed election dates are all the rage in Canada. The UK Parliament is also now considering them. The composite narrative that has emerged is that fixed election dates appear to be working in Canadian provinces and territories but have not yet established themselves federally. This article argues that this account is too simplistic. A deeper analysis reveals that proponents of fixed election date legislation overpromised and underdelivered. Moreover, even where they appear to be working, fixed election date legislation may be contributing to the continuing degradation of the democratic body politic in Canada.

This paper addresses three stages of fixed election dates in Canada: their past, present and future. Given that fixed election date legislation only dates back to the beginning of the first decade of this century, this framework may appear overly ambitious. However, I will attempt to place this legislation in its proper context (the past), evaluate how it is operating to date (the present) and prognosticate about its effects (the future). In this vein, I begin by examining the motivations that led to the introduction of fixed election date legislation in the relevant provincial and federal jurisdictions. I will show that fixed election date legislation grew out of the response to the malaise that we have come to term “the democratic deficit”.

Next, I examine the current operation of fixed election date legislation both federally and provincially. I analyze Hansard debates as well as government statements to identify and analyze the five main arguments by proponents of fixed election date legislation: fairness, transparency, accountability, improved governance and increased voter turnout. The only argument that comes down wholly in the positive side of the democratic ledger is the governance argument on the better administration of elections by the independent election bodies like Elections Canada. The other arguments are less conclusive or in the case of voter turnout, have failed to achieve the desired effects.

Finally, I turn to the future prospects for fixed election date legislation in Canada. Here, I analyze the legal, political and practical issues surrounding their implementation. I conclude that if fixed election date laws are to have their desired effect, they will produce a transfer of power from the first Minister to the Lieutenant Governors or the Governor General, as the case may be. This raises a host of subsidiary issues that may be detrimental to the relationship between these offices. I conclude by explaining why I think fixed election date legislation is injurious to Canadian democracy and should be repealed.