The Economics of Infection Control

Posted: 16 Sep 2011

See all articles by Mark Gersovitz

Mark Gersovitz

Johns Hopkins University - Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

Economics plus epidemiology provide models of infections and associated behavior of private individuals. They show how infections generate problems of dynamic externalities, scope for government to offset externalities, and problems of the second best when government cannot or does not. Features of these models affect conclusions about individual behavior and government policy: the transition states into and out of infection; the nature of matching among susceptibles and infecteds; the opportunities for prevention, including vaccination, and for therapies and their costs; and the targeting of these health interventions at people, depending on health status. There may be multiple endemic optimal steady states.

Suggested Citation

Gersovitz, Mark, The Economics of Infection Control (October 2011). Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 277-296, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1928380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-083110-120052

Mark Gersovitz (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University - Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences ( email )

Department of Economics
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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