Some Doubts About Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights
26 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2011 Last revised: 22 May 2012
Date Written: September 1, 2011
Abstract
For decades, the paramount alternative to the Interest Theory of rights has been the Will Theory. This article seeks to strengthen the position of the Interest Theory by discrediting its chief rival. Because the present article's main critique of the Will Theory proceeds from premises that do not beg any questions against that theory, it is particularly telling. It goes further than most previous critiques in rebutting prominent versions of the Will Theory on their own terms. Moreover, by accentuating the untenability of a sophisticated endeavor by Gopal Sreenivasan to produce a hybrid theory of rights, the paper aims to emphasize that the Will Theory's failures are the Interest Theory's successes. Given that a promising attempt to leave behind the Interest/Will debates has proved to be otiose, we are well advised to conclude that the unsatisfactoriness of the Will Theory is a ground for embracing the Interest Theory. Instead of trying to transcend the aforementioned debates, the present article shows that they are worthwhile, and it makes progress toward resolving them.
Keywords: Rights, Hohfeld, Interest Theory, Will Theory, Hillel Steiner, legal powers, legal liberties
JEL Classification: K49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation