Establishing a New Order: The Growth of the State and the Decline of Witch Trials in France

35 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2011

See all articles by Noel D. Johnson

Noel D. Johnson

State University of New York (SUNY) - Buffalo; George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Mark Koyama

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

John V. Nye

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Mercatus Center; National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: October 2, 2011

Abstract

The growth of the 17th century French state contributed to the establishment to a more regular, and even liberal legal order. Higher fiscal demands on the state led to a process of legal standardization that extended the rule of law. We use data on witch trials and taxation covering twenty-one regions between 1550 and 1700 to support this claim. Regions where higher taxes were collected were also less likely to see witch trials. Thus fiscal consolidation promoted a more rational legal order.

Keywords: Economic History, Fiscal Capacity, France, Witchcraft, Legal Capacity

JEL Classification: N43, D70, H10, K40, O10

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Noel D. and Johnson, Noel D. and Koyama, Mark and Nye, John V. C., Establishing a New Order: The Growth of the State and the Decline of Witch Trials in France (October 2, 2011). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-43, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1937308 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937308

Noel D. Johnson (Contact Author)

State University of New York (SUNY) - Buffalo ( email )

12 Capen Hall
Buffalo, NY 14222
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Mark Koyama

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~mkoyama2/About.html

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

John V. C. Nye

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-4272 (Phone)

Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
260
Abstract Views
2,240
Rank
213,001
PlumX Metrics