Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion - The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments
38 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2011
Date Written: July 3, 2011
Abstract
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.
Keywords: cartels, collusion, communication, experiments, repeated games.
JEL Classification: C7, C9, L4, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
By David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
-
Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
By David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
-
Predation and its Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887-1914
By David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
-
The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
By David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
-
Tacit Collusion with Price Matching Punishments
By Yuanzhu Lu and Julian Wright
-
Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
By David J. Cooper and Kai-uwe Kuhn
-
Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
By David J. Cooper and Kai-uwe Kuhn