International Climate Agreements, Cost Reductions and Convergence of Partisan Politics

30 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2011

See all articles by Patrick Laurency

Patrick Laurency

German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer

Dirk Schindler

Erasmus School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 30, 2011

Abstract

In recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have been leveled with respect to climate protection. We show that this partial convergence in party platforms can be explained by international climate agreements, effectively reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We set up a voting model in which political parties differ in their preferences for climate protection and in which (national) climate protection causes both resource costs and distortions in the international allocation of production. International agreements, which reduce greenhouse gas emissions, decrease effective abatement costs. This affects traditional parties in a different way than green parties, since a lower preference for climate protection implies a higher price (cost) elasticity of demand. Thus, climate agreements can lead to more political consensus within countries, even if politicians are partisans. We also point out that increasing flexibility and efficiency in abatement mechanisms is preferable to forming a climate coalition that focuses directly on emission reduction commitments.

Keywords: climate protection, political economy, green parties, platform convergence

JEL Classification: Q540, H410, D720

Suggested Citation

Laurency, Patrick and Schindler, Dirk, International Climate Agreements, Cost Reductions and Convergence of Partisan Politics (September 30, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3591, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1938910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1938910

Patrick Laurency

German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer ( email )

Freiherr vom Stein Strasse 2
Speyer, 67346
Germany

Dirk Schindler (Contact Author)

Erasmus School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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