Failing Failed States: A Response to John Yoo

California Law Review Circuit, Vol. 2, No. 40, pp. 40-51, 2011

Albany Law School Research Paper No. 28 of 2011-2012

13 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2011 Last revised: 14 Oct 2011

See all articles by James Thuo Gathii

James Thuo Gathii

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Date Written: October 6, 2011

Abstract

In Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95 (2011), John Yoo shows that intervening states seeking to transform the social, economic, and political framework of failed states aim to do too much and ultimately fail. Yoo proposes that the role of intervening states should be minimal — enforcing power-sharing agreements between competing groups within failed states, rather than transforming them into parliamentary democracies. Stated another way, he argues that failed states are best stabilized by military guarantees from western countries. He argues that the rules prohibiting the use of force should be loosened to facilitate such military guarantees as a means of re-stabilizing failed states.

In my response to Yoo’s, I argue that his proposals overstate the benefits of loosening the prohibition against the use of force and the rule that occupied countries be restored to full sovereignty. By proceeding primarily from a security perspective, he offers a military solution that risks exacerbating rather than resolving the problem of failed states while failing to support his arguments with persuasive evidence and case studies to support the efficacy of his proposals. Ultimately, I disagree with the means Yoo proposes to fix failed states.

Suggested Citation

Gathii, James Thuo, Failing Failed States: A Response to John Yoo (October 6, 2011). California Law Review Circuit, Vol. 2, No. 40, pp. 40-51, 2011, Albany Law School Research Paper No. 28 of 2011-2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939857

James Thuo Gathii (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )

25 East Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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