Why Do Elites Permit Reform?

THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 53, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College, 2009

9 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2011

See all articles by John V. Nye

John V. Nye

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Mercatus Center; National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: October 7, 2011

Abstract

This essay examines the question of why elites within pre-modern or natural sates, who earn economic rents and other forms of political privilege from the status quo, ever consent to reform that would threaten their dominance within the political economic order. The paper examines this question in the context of eighteenth-century Britain, with particular emphasis on the role of elites in shifting the institutional rules of the game toward more economic competition and political openness.

Keywords: elites, social reform

JEL Classification: O10

Suggested Citation

Nye, John V. C., Why Do Elites Permit Reform? (October 7, 2011). THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 53, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1940192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1940192

John V. C. Nye (Contact Author)

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