Weathering the Financial Crisis: Good Policy or Good Luck?

28 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2011

See all articles by Stephen G. Cecchetti

Stephen G. Cecchetti

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Brandeis International Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Systemic Risk Board

Michael King

affiliation not provided to SSRN

James Yetman

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Date Written: August 1, 2011

Abstract

The macroeconomic performance of individual countries varied markedly during the 2007-09 global financial crisis. While China's growth never dipped below 6% and Australia's worst quarter was no growth, the economies of Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom suffered annualized GDP contractions of 5-10% per quarter for five to seven quarters in a row. We exploit this cross-country variation to examine whether a country's macroeconomic performance over this period was the result of pre-crisis policy decisions or just good luck. The answer is a bit of both. Better-performing economies featured a better-capitalized banking sector, lower loan-to-deposit ratios, a current account surplus, high foreign exchange reserves and low levels and growth rates of private sector credit-to-GDP. In other words, sound policy decisions and institutions reduced their vulnerability to the financial crisis. But these economies also featured a low level of financial openness and less exposure to US creditors, suggesting that good luck played a part.

Keywords: financial crisis, principal components

JEL Classification: E65, F44

Suggested Citation

Cecchetti, Stephen G. and Cecchetti, Stephen G. and King, Michael and Yetman, James, Weathering the Financial Crisis: Good Policy or Good Luck? (August 1, 2011). BIS Working Paper No. 351, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1942165

Stephen G. Cecchetti (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Brandeis International Business School ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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European Systemic Risk Board ( email )

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Michael King

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

James Yetman

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

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Basel, Basel-Stadt 4002
Switzerland

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