Do Human Rights Prosecutions Deter Dictators from Leaving Power?

Posted: 28 Oct 2011

See all articles by Abel Escribà-Folch

Abel Escribà-Folch

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Joseph Wright

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Political Science and Women's Studies

Date Written: October 27, 2011

Abstract

Do human rights prosecutions deter dictators from leaving power? Recent advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries, providing evidence in favor of punishing human rights abusers. However, the traditional literature on transitions has usually emphasized that prosecuting officials for their past crimes may jeopardize the process of political change. The rationale is simple: if dictators anticipate that leaving office may entail being prosecuted, they will resist any political change and will strive to retain office. The creation of the ICC has further revitalized this debate. In this paper, we assess how human rights prosecutions influence political stability in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. We examine how neighbor THRP’s affect the likelihood of different types of regime transitions, including violent and peaceful as well transitions to democracy and subsequent authoritarian regimes during the period 1980-2008. We create a proxy to measure the extent to which dictators think they may be punished if they step down: we count the number of THRP’s in neighboring countries. Consistent with critics of international human rights regimes, the evidence suggests that on average dictators are less likely to transition to a democracy when their neighbors face prosecutions for human rights abuses. This result, however, varies substantially by regime type and is the strongest for personalist dictators. Personalist dictators are the least likely have institutional guarantees of their interests once they leave power because they lack domestic political institutions -such as a dominant party or strong military- that can protect them after leaving power. This research has implications for the study of international human rights regimes, the role of the ICC, democratization, and repression.

Keywords: Prosecutions, human rights, democratizations, regime types

Suggested Citation

Escribà-Folch, Abel and Wright, Joseph, Do Human Rights Prosecutions Deter Dictators from Leaving Power? (October 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1950203

Abel Escribà-Folch (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Joseph Wright

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Political Science and Women's Studies ( email )

Pond Lab, Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA PA 16802-2800
United States
2022888749 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
442
PlumX Metrics