Do Human Rights Prosecutions Deter Dictators from Leaving Power?
Posted: 28 Oct 2011
Date Written: October 27, 2011
Abstract
Do human rights prosecutions deter dictators from leaving power? Recent advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries, providing evidence in favor of punishing human rights abusers. However, the traditional literature on transitions has usually emphasized that prosecuting officials for their past crimes may jeopardize the process of political change. The rationale is simple: if dictators anticipate that leaving office may entail being prosecuted, they will resist any political change and will strive to retain office. The creation of the ICC has further revitalized this debate. In this paper, we assess how human rights prosecutions influence political stability in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. We examine how neighbor THRP’s affect the likelihood of different types of regime transitions, including violent and peaceful as well transitions to democracy and subsequent authoritarian regimes during the period 1980-2008. We create a proxy to measure the extent to which dictators think they may be punished if they step down: we count the number of THRP’s in neighboring countries. Consistent with critics of international human rights regimes, the evidence suggests that on average dictators are less likely to transition to a democracy when their neighbors face prosecutions for human rights abuses. This result, however, varies substantially by regime type and is the strongest for personalist dictators. Personalist dictators are the least likely have institutional guarantees of their interests once they leave power because they lack domestic political institutions -such as a dominant party or strong military- that can protect them after leaving power. This research has implications for the study of international human rights regimes, the role of the ICC, democratization, and repression.
Keywords: Prosecutions, human rights, democratizations, regime types
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