Which Preferences Can Democracy Serve?

24 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2011

See all articles by Alon Harel

Alon Harel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Moses Shayo

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 30, 2011

Abstract

Democracy is often perceived or justified as a means to realizing voters' preferences. Two major difficulties have received much attention: how to aggregate votes and how to align the interests of representatives with the preferences of voters. This paper identifies a third difficulty which stems from the fact that some voters care not only about the electoral outcome (Outcome preferences) but also about the act of voting itself (Voting preferences). If Voting and Outcome preferences are incongruent, then democracy may not be able to satisfy voters’ preferences even if all voters have identical preferences and if all representatives scrupulously implement the policies voters choose. Indeed, as no voter is likely to be pivotal, rational voters would tend to vote primarily on the basis of their Voting preferences. In this case, the person elected (or the policy executed) may not be the one voters wish to see elected (or executed). Taking Voting preferences seriously sheds new light on classical controversies in political theory, e.g., the delegate/trustee controversy, the democratic deficit, and judicial review. We show that, at times, seemingly undemocratic practices could be understood as a means to facilitate the simultaneous satisfaction of both Outcome and Voting preferences.

Suggested Citation

Harel, Alon and Shayo, Moses, Which Preferences Can Democracy Serve? (October 30, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1951451 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1951451

Alon Harel (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel
97 22 588 2582 (Phone)
97 22 582 3042 (Fax)

Moses Shayo

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel

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