Fairness Perceptions and Prosocial Emotions in the Power to Take

Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 908-922, 2010

38 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2011 Last revised: 18 Aug 2012

See all articles by Ernesto Reuben

Ernesto Reuben

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after receiving punishment. The focus is on how proposers in a power-to-take game adjust their behavior depending on their fairness perceptions, their experienced emotions, and their interaction with responders. We find that fairness plays an important role: proposers who take what they consider to be an unfair amount experience higher intensities of prosocial emotions (shame and guilt), particularly if they are punished. This emotional experience induces proposers to lower their claims. We also find that fairness perceptions vary considerably between individuals. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that proposers who considered themselves fair are taking less from responders than other proposers. Lastly, we provide evidence that suggests that eliciting emotions through self-reports does not affect subsequent behavior.

Keywords: shame, guilt, punishment, prosocial emotions, proposers, power‐to‐take game

JEL Classification: Z13, C92, C72, K42

Suggested Citation

Reuben, Ernesto and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Fairness Perceptions and Prosocial Emotions in the Power to Take (2010). Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 908-922, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1951646

Ernesto Reuben (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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