Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production

55 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2011

See all articles by Pol Antras

Pol Antras

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I also review empirical work suggestive of the empirical relevance of the property-rights theory. Along the way, I develop novel theoretical results and also outline some of the key limitations of existing contributions.

Keywords: intrafirm trade, multinational firms, outsourcing, property rights

JEL Classification: D23, F10, F12, F14, F21, F23, L22, L23

Suggested Citation

Antras, Pol, Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production (October 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8598, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1952465

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