Maximal Symmetry and the Nash Solution

Posted: 29 Nov 1999

See all articles by Marco Mariotti

Marco Mariotti

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics

Abstract

The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterised by using the new axiom of Maximal Symmetry in place of Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Symmetry. This axiom expresses the idea that a fair arbitrator should treat symmetric alternatives in the same way, subject to the feasibility constraint. An advantage of the proposed characterisations is that they are valid on a wide set of domains, in particular domains including, or consisting of, non-convex problems.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Mariotti, Marco, Maximal Symmetry and the Nash Solution. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=195513

Marco Mariotti (Contact Author)

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

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Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+01392 263219 (Phone)
+01392 263242 (Fax)

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