Bribing to Circumvent Capture and Facilitate Participation in Social Programs: Evidence from Indian Villages
23 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2011
Date Written: November 20, 2011
Abstract
Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their odds of participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on the odds of participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.
Keywords: bribery, program capture, welfare effects, rural India
JEL Classification: D31, D63, D73, O12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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