A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities

Rochester Institute of Technology Economics Department Working Paper No. 11-09

12 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2011

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 12, 2011

Abstract

In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism.

Keywords: Auction, Efficiency, Noxious Facility, Symmetric Equilibrium

JEL Classification: Q53, D44

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Beladi, Hamid, A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities (December 12, 2011). Rochester Institute of Technology Economics Department Working Paper No. 11-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971422

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology ( email )

Department of Economics, RIT
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Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
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