Optimal Management and Differential Games in the Presence of Threshold Effects - The Shallow Lake Model

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-001

28 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2012

See all articles by Puduru Viswanadha Reddy

Puduru Viswanadha Reddy

Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Johannes M. Schumacher

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE)

Jacob C. Engwerda

retiree

Date Written: January 3, 2012

Abstract

In this article we analyze how the presence of thresholds influences multi agent decision making situations. We introduce a class of discounted autonomous optimal control problems with threshold effects and discuss tools to analyze these problems. Later, using these results we investigate two types of threshold effects; namely, simple and hysteresis switching, in the canonical model of the shallow lake. We solve the optimal management and open loop Nash equilibrium solutions for the shallow lake model with threshold effects. We establish a bifurcation analysis of the optimal vector field. Further, we observe that modeling with threshold effects simplifies this analysis. To be precise, the bifurcation scenarios rely on simple rules (inequalities) which can be verified easily. However, the qualitative behavior of the switching vector field is similar to the smooth case.

Keywords: Optimal control, Differential games, Threshold effects, Discontinuous dynamics

JEL Classification: C61, Q57

Suggested Citation

Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha and Schumacher, J.M. (Hans) and Engwerda, Jacob C., Optimal Management and Differential Games in the Presence of Threshold Effects - The Shallow Lake Model (January 3, 2012). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1978802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978802

Puduru Viswanadha Reddy (Contact Author)

Indian Institute of Technology Madras ( email )

Department of Electrical Engineering
IIT Madras
Chennai, 600036
India

J.M. (Hans) Schumacher

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Jacob C. Engwerda

retiree ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2174 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3280 (Fax)

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