A Century of Firm-Bank Relationships: Why the Transition to Multiple Banking?

FDIC Working Paper No. 2011-07

43 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2012

See all articles by Fabio Braggion

Fabio Braggion

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Steven Ongena

University of Zurich - Department Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; KU Leuven; NTNU Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 1, 2011

Abstract

We study how relationships between firms and banks evolved between during the Twentieth century in Britain. We document and explain a remarkable transition from single to multiple firm-bank relationships during the last twenty years of the sample period. Larger, global, or transparent companies with greater needs for bank credit and specialized services are more likely to add a bank. Deregulation and intensifying competition in the banking sector during the 1970s spurred banks to supply credit and services through these multilateral arrangements. Firm size, geographical presence, leverage, and control determine whether a clearer bank, another British bank or a foreign bank is added.

Keywords: banking sector, competition, multiple banking

JEL Classification: G21, N23, N24

Suggested Citation

Braggion, Fabio and Ongena, Steven R. G., A Century of Firm-Bank Relationships: Why the Transition to Multiple Banking? (March 1, 2011). FDIC Working Paper No. 2011-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1982162 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982162

Fabio Braggion (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Steven R. G. Ongena

University of Zurich - Department Finance ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, 8001
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

NTNU Business School ( email )

Norway

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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