Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions
12 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2012
Date Written: February 7, 2012
Abstract
We study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases.
Keywords: Core Selecting Auctions, Mechanism Design
JEL Classification: D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
By Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
-
A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
By Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
-
Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions
By Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, ...
-
On the Impossibility of Core-Selecting Auctions
By Jacob K. Goeree and Yuanchuan Lien
-
Strategic Non-Bidding in an Ascending Core-Selecting Auction
By Ryuji Sano
-
An Equilibrium Analysis of a Package Auction with Single-Minded Bidders
By Ryuji Sano
-
Vickrey-Reserve Auctions and an Equilibrium Equivalence
By Ryuji Sano
-
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Ascending Combinatorial Auctions
By Ryuji Sano
-
Asymmetric Information in Oil and Gas Lease Auctions with a National Company
By Rafael Matoso and Marcelo Rezende