Why Not a Regional Approach to State Renewable Power Mandates?

3 San Diego Journal of Climate and Energy Law 79 (2012)

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-04

29 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2012 Last revised: 5 Apr 2012

See all articles by Kirsten H. Engel

Kirsten H. Engel

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

Date Written: April 3, 2012

Abstract

Dismayed at the slow progress being made in reducing the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels, some scholars have decried the divergence between energy and environmental law. An especially illustrative example of this is found in the differing geographic scope of programs designed to cap greenhouse gases on the one hand and those designed to grow the market for renewable energy on the other. The former are the subject of more efficient regional approaches while the latter remain primarily the product of states working independently of each other. Some have suggested a national renewable power mandate as an antidote to the inefficiency of state-level renewable portfolio mandates. This article takes a different tact by suggesting states create regional renewable energy markets supported by uniform mandates. This solution will enhance the efficiency of state-level renewable power mandates and reduces the Commerce Clause risk currently posed by the geographic favoritism displayed in state-level renewable power mandates.

Keywords: environmental law, greenhouse gas caps, renewable energy, regional renewable energy markets

JEL Classification: K32, K2

Suggested Citation

Engel, Kirsten H., Why Not a Regional Approach to State Renewable Power Mandates? (April 3, 2012). 3 San Diego Journal of Climate and Energy Law 79 (2012), Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2005821

Kirsten H. Engel (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
520-621-5444 (Phone)

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