Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games

Posted: 7 Mar 2012

See all articles by Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Rann Smorodinsky

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

Date Written: March 7, 2012

Abstract

Green, and later Sabourian studied repeated games where a player’s payoff depends on his actions and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and show that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend these results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymous function of players’ actions, and where players’ strategies may depend nonanonymously on signals of other players’ behavior. Our argument also provides a conceptually simpler proof of Green and Sabourian’s results, showing how their analysis is driven by general bounds on the number of pivotal players in a game.

Keywords: repeated games, equilibrium, large games

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Al-Najjar, Nabil I. and Smorodinsky, Rann, Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games (March 7, 2012). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 37, 2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017432

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5426 (Phone)
847-467-1220 (Fax)

Rann Smorodinsky (Contact Author)

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management ( email )

Haifa 32000
Israel

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