Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information

Posted: 7 Mar 2012

See all articles by Ehud Lehrer

Ehud Lehrer

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Rann Smorodinsky

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

Date Written: October 13, 1994

Abstract

We examine repeated games with incomplete information where the type spaces of the players may be large. It is shown that if the belief of each player, regarding future play of the game, accommodates the true play then a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game will evolve, with time, into an equilibrium of the complete information game, i.e., the realized game where the types of all players are common knowledge. We introduce the notion of accommodating beliefs which involves two requirements. The first is that the belief assigns positive probability to neighborhoods of the true distribution and the second is that what lies outside of a neighborhood is separated from the true distribution by sufficient incoming observations this is the separation property defined in the paper.

Keywords: learning, merging, equilibrium

JEL Classification: C82, D83

Suggested Citation

Lehrer, Ehud and Smorodinsky, Rann, Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information (October 13, 1994). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 18, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017446

Ehud Lehrer

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Rann Smorodinsky (Contact Author)

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management ( email )

Haifa 32000
Israel

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