A Strong Paradox of Multiple Elections

Posted: 12 Mar 2012

See all articles by Marco Scarsini

Marco Scarsini

Luiss University Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Date Written: March, 11 2012

Abstract

We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

Keywords: voting paradoxes, referendum

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Scarsini, Marco, A Strong Paradox of Multiple Elections (March, 11 2012). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019839

Marco Scarsini (Contact Author)

Luiss University Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, RM 00197
Italy

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
365
PlumX Metrics