A Strong Paradox of Multiple Elections
Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Date Written: March, 11 2012
Abstract
We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.
Keywords: voting paradoxes, referendum
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Scarsini, Marco, A Strong Paradox of Multiple Elections (March, 11 2012). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019839
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