Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games

33 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2012

See all articles by Yakov Babichenko

Yakov Babichenko

Technion, Industrial Engineering and Managemenet

Date Written: March 18, 2012

Abstract

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c*n*logn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e^{c'n} for some constant c'>0.

Keywords: Best-reply dynamic, anonimouse games

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Babichenko, Yakov, Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games (March 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028522

Yakov Babichenko (Contact Author)

Technion, Industrial Engineering and Managemenet ( email )

Hiafa, 3434113
Israel

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