Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games
33 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2012
Date Written: March 18, 2012
Abstract
We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c*n*logn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e^{c'n} for some constant c'>0.
Keywords: Best-reply dynamic, anonimouse games
JEL Classification: C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Babichenko, Yakov, Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games (March 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028522
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