Network Governance Theory: A Gramscian Critique

Environment and Planning A, 44(11), 2687 – 2704

46 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2012 Last revised: 3 Dec 2012

See all articles by Jonathan S. Davies

Jonathan S. Davies

De Montfort University; Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Date Written: December 3, 2012

Abstract

Influential governance theories argue that we live increasingly in a world of networks, either relegating hierarchy to the shadows or dismissing it altogether. This paper develops a Gramscian critique of these currents, advancing two key arguments. First, drawing on Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and passive revolution, it reinterprets the cultivation of networks as a prominent element in the hegemonic strategies of Western neoliberalism, exemplified by UK public policy. Second, however, governing networks struggle to cultivate trust, relying instead on hierarchy and closure. The paper argues that network governance can therefore be understood as a form of Gramsci’s integral state, a concept which highlights both the continuing centrality of coercion in the governance system and the limits of the networks project. It concludes that conceiving of urban governing networks as micro-configurations of the integral state offers a distinctive way of overcoming the ‘government to governance’ dualism.

Keywords: Governance, Networks, Gramsci, Neoliberalism, Hegemony, Integral State, Passive Revolution

Suggested Citation

Davies, Jonathan S. and Davies, Jonathan S., Network Governance Theory: A Gramscian Critique (December 3, 2012). Environment and Planning A, 44(11), 2687 – 2704, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029022

Jonathan S. Davies (Contact Author)

Centre for Urban Research on Austerity ( email )

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De Montfort University ( email )

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Leicester, East Midlands LE1 9BH
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.dmu.ac.uk/professor-jonathan-davies

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