Facilitating Intractable Political Transformation of Armed Rebel Groups: Bridging Gaps between Transformation and Peace Agreements

Posted: 28 Mar 2012

See all articles by Ariel Macaspac Hernandez

Ariel Macaspac Hernandez

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE); University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute for Development and Peace

Date Written: March 28, 2012

Abstract

This working paper intends to systematically evaluate the post-agreement negotiation process and how political transformation of armed rebel groups is promoted or inhibited by factors (referred to as stumbling blocks) to be found in the post-agreement environment. How is the expected political transformation itself paradoxically inhibiting rebel groups to assume political leadership? What factors are usually disregarded in the political transformation because they are very obvious or because they do not go along existing assumptions and concepts of political transformation? Similarly important is the question how complexities in the political transformation process are to be coped with.

To answer the above questions, I intend first to evaluate various concepts of political transformation. What is understood with political transformation? Why is political transformation inevitably equated with the transition of armed groups to political parties? How can this “Eurocentric” conceptualization be applicable to various conflict contexts where similar historical foundations of a party system are simply missing? The establishment of political parties in Europe was oriented to the ideological and socio-economic class cleavages and is not primarily linked to nation-building. European political parties did not arise from armed rebellion. Therefore, expecting the smooth transformation of rebel groups to political parties in non-European conflict cases is not only misleading, but also unfair, particularly when developmental programs and aids are to be given under the condition of successful transformation of armed rebel groups to political parties. Defining successful political transformation primarily as a situation where armed rebel groups have emerged as political parties limits the prospects of sustainable peace. It merely involves a simplistic and formalistic application of European terms in non-European conflict contexts. How is political transformation conducted? Are there alternative measurements of successful political transformation? Are clans and warlords per definition debarred from political transition? These questions are answered through the introduction of the phases of political transformation.

Furthermore, while I deal with political transformation as a concept, I aim to use the Mindanao conflict as a case study to understand the complexity of political transformation. The intractability of the conflict in Southern Philippines is highly attributed to the failure of Moro rebel groups to assume political leadership in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Mediated peace agreements have led to the formation of several break-away factions who in turn undermine the legitimacy of the rebel group they broke away from and maintaining the level of violence in the conflict area. The Mindanao case shows several attempts of armed rebel groups to assume political leadership in an autonomous government, but due to several stumbling blocks their attempts have failed. Is the constitutional framework within which peace processes are forced to move inhibiting political transformation? Is the de facto failure to disarm the MNLF and the armed Moro rebellion in general preventing political liberalization? How can a hypothetically disarmed MNLF or MILF develop political maturity when opposing (break-away) groups within the rebellion movement remain armed? In the light of the (almost) impossibility of disarmament of established rebel groups, it should be then asked whether political transformation is ever possible in the absence of DDR? The most important question refers to how political transformation of armed rebel groups can be actually addressed during negotiations?

Finally, the ultimate goal of this paper is to come up with recommendations on how to facilitate political transformation of armed rebel groups such as the MNLF and MILF by formulating strategies to cope up with the complexity of political transformation. Using again the categories: actors, issues, structures, processes and outcomes as used above allows a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the stumbling blocks providing resources when formulating strategies.

Keywords: Political Transformation, Peace Process, MNLF, Mindanao, Philippines

Suggested Citation

Hernandez, Ariel Macaspac, Facilitating Intractable Political Transformation of Armed Rebel Groups: Bridging Gaps between Transformation and Peace Agreements (March 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2030274

Ariel Macaspac Hernandez (Contact Author)

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 4
Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute for Development and Peace ( email )

Geibelstr. 41
Duisburg, D-47057
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
184
Abstract Views
1,059
Rank
296,078
PlumX Metrics