Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable

39 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2012

See all articles by Mark Schelker

Mark Schelker

University of Fribourg; CREMA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); SIAW, University of St. Gallen

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Date Written: April 20, 2012

Abstract

Divided government is not only the outcome of moderate voters’ electoral decision to balance party ideology in government, but a more general reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term limited executives (i.e., “lame ducks”) cannot be held accountable due to the missing re-election incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature and restrict his ability to extract rents. Based on US state data I present empirical evidence showing that the probability of divided government is 9 to 15 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.

Keywords: divided government, lame duck, term limit, accountability

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Schelker, Mark, Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable (April 20, 2012). U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2012-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2043019 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2043019

Mark Schelker (Contact Author)

University of Fribourg ( email )

Fribourg
Switzerland

CREMA ( email )

Gellertstrasse 18
Basel
Zurich, CH 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

SIAW, University of St. Gallen ( email )

Bodanstrasse 8
Saint Gallen, St. Gallen CH-9000
Switzerland

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