Market Restructuring and Pricing in the Hospital Industry
40 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2000
Date Written: January 4, 2000
Abstract
This paper examines the price effects of recent hospital mergers and acquisitions. Using data from mergers and acquisitions that occurred in Ohio and California I examine post merger price changes at the level of individual services or Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Results indicate that hospital mergers and acquisitions result in increased prices at the DRG level. Further, price increases are greater in DRGs where the merging hospitals gained substantial market power compared to DRGs where the merging hospitals did not gain significant market power. These results suggest that DRG specific market power plays an important role in a hospital's post-merger pricing strategy.
JEL Classification: D40, I11, L80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Competition in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor and Robert J. Town
-
Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor and William B. Vogt
-
Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor and William B. Vogt
-
Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor and Deborah Haas-wilson
-
Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor and Deborah Haas-wilson
-
Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the 2nd Best in Health Care Markets
By Martin Gaynor, Deborah Haas-wilson, ...
-
By Martin Gaynor, Deborah Haas-wilson, ...
-
By Martin Gaynor and William B. Vogt
-
By Martin Gaynor and William B. Vogt