P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision
19 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2012
Date Written: April 1, 2012
Abstract
We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn rises patient benefits.
Keywords: Altruism, performance, motivation
JEL Classification: D64, I11, I18, H42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja, P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision (April 1, 2012). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 331, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2070537 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2070537
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