Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work

Posted: 25 Jun 2012

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents' incentives are driven not by the voters' evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome's information about the incumbent's type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.

Suggested Citation

Ashworth, Scott, Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work (June 2012). Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 15, pp. 183-201, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2089190 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823

Scott Ashworth (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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